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I. INTRODUCTION
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,' the Supreme
Court refused to extend blanket antitrust immunity to the governmental
activities of municipalities.' Preceding Burger Court decisions had nar-
rowly confined what was once thought an extensive exception to the reach
of the antitrust laws.' Thus, the result in City of Lafayette was
predictable.
Practically, the decision has a potential impact on the thousands of
municipal government units in this country. Political subdivisions now
may be liable for treble damages to the very citizens whom they tax and
serve. Already the Justice Department has stated its intention to enforce
the antitrust laws against municipalities as vigorously as it does against
private corporations."
Moreover, the decision has additional importance because of a possible
tension with the current Court's recognition of the importance of the
rights of the states and cities in our dual federalist governmental system.5
In City of Lafayette the Court refused to extend automatic antitrust im-
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; Associate Professor of Law,
Loyola University of Chicago. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1973, University of Texas; L.L.M. 1977, Columbia
University. The author thanks Professor Harvey Goldschmid for his valuable comments on earlier
drafts of this article. Errors remain the author's responsibility. The helpful assistance of student
Frank Pawlak in the latter stages of this article is also appreciated.
1. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
2. Id. at 411-13.
3. See notes 10-57 infra and accompanying text.
4. Wall St. J., May 16, 1978, at 14, col. 2.
5. This digression is, some would say, concomitant with the Court's recent failure to recognize the
rights of the individuals within those entities. See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The
New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1065-66 (1977).
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munity to municipalities under the state action antitrust doctrine.' In so
holding, the Court declined to recognize any independent sovereign status
for political subdivisions, while acknowledging that states do qualify for
such treatment.7 Thus, although City of Lafayette represents at least in
part a policy decision about the reach of a judicially defined antitrust
immunity, the decision may have significant federalist overtones concern-
ing the sovereign attributes of states and cities.
This article will (1) examine the state action exemption applied within
an antitrust context as initially interpreted in Parker v. Brown8 and quali-
fied by a series of recent Supreme Court decisions; (2) analyze the City of
Lafayette decision; (3) discuss the City of Lafayette decision in light of
National League of Cities v. Usery9 and the significant federalist implica-
tions underlying both decisions; and (4) explore the ramifications of the
City of Lafayette decision on the antitrust susceptibility of governmental
activities of municipalities. Further, the article will attempt to show that
the antitrust state action decisions read with National League of Cities
provide the necessary framework for the protection of states and munici-
palities from intrusion by federal regulation.
II. THE Parker v. Brown DOCTRINE
In Parker v. Brown 0 the Supreme Court ruled that the antitrust laws
did not apply to the anticompetitive consequences of a California state
raisin prorate program."1 The state legislature had authorized an elabo-
rate marketing system for raisins which largely eliminated competition
among the producers.1 2 The program was designed to stabilize the price
of raisins by regulating the raisin producers' output.13
A unanimous Court found that the antitrust laws did not extend to the
California prorate program, reasoning that the Sherman Act was in-
tended to prohibit individual and not state conduct." Since the program
6. 435 U.S. at 411-13.
7. Id.
8. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
9. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
10. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
11. Id. at 350-51. Much earlier, in Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), the Court had found
that the state of Texas had plenary power to license barge pilots operating out of the port of Galves-
ton in the absence of express congressional objection. Thus, the Court concluded that the pilotage
services were not subject to the antitrust laws. Id. at 344-45. See also Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908
(C.C.D.S.C. 1895). See generally Rogers, The State Action Antitrust Immunity, 49 U. COLO. L.
REv. 147, 151-54 (1"978).
12. 317 U.S. at 346-48.
13. Id. at 346.
14. Id. at 352.
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derived its authority and efficacy from the state legislature and would not
have existed without a state mandate, the Court held that the anticompe-
titive aspects of the program were not a product of individual activity.'8
Lower courts subsequently interpreted Parker v. Brown as placing any
state or state authorized activity beyond the reach of the antitrust laws.16
For over thirty years, however, the Supreme Court took little interest in
the development of the exemption to the antitrust law that it had created,
routinely denying certiorari on the issue.1 7 Then, beginning with Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar,a the Court began to significantly curtail the extent
of the exemption.
In Goldfarb, the Court found that a minimum fee schedule published
by the Fairfax, Virginia, County Bar Association and enforced by the
Virginia State Bar constituted unlawful price fixing which was not
shielded from the antitrust laws by Parker v. Brown. The Court held that
the threshold requirement for conferring antitrust immunity on state re-
lated activity is whether the activity is required by the state acting in its
sovereign capacity."9 Further, the Court held that the immunity is justi-
fied only if the state action was in fact compelled rather than merely
prompted or authorized by the state acting as sovereign.' 0 Since the State
of Virginia did not require the maintenance of a minimum fee schedule
for lawyers, the action was not compelled by the state and the Parker
immunity could not attach."
15. Id. at 350.
16. See, e.g., Business Aids, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir.
1973); Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1062 (1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971); Wainwright v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ga. 1969). See generally
Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Marnell v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
Individual conduct authorized by states was thought immune even though the Parker defendants were
government officials. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc., 394 F.2d 672 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968); Okefenokee Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Florida
Power & Light Co., 214 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954); Fleming v. Travelers Indem. Co., 324 F. Supp.
1404 (D. Mass. 1971). It should be remembered, however, that the Court in Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S.
332 (1904), a case in which the state was not a party, held that state licensed pilots were not subject
to the antitrust laws. See Rogers, supra note 1I, at 165-66.
17. See, e.g., Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1001 (1972); Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied. 404
U.S. 1047 (1972); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (lst Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 930 (1966). Cf. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (Miller-
Tydings Act did not entitle liquor distributor to enjoin price cutting in absence of contract).
18. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
19. Id. at 790.
20. Id. at 791.
21. The Virginia legislature authorized the Virginia Supreme Court to regulate the legal profes-
1980:305]
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Next, in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,2 2 the Court further refined the
state action exemption. Cantor, a retail druggist, filed suit against Detroit
Edison, the utility supplying electricity to southeastern Michigan, claim-
ing that the utility's policy of dispensing free light bulbs to consumers of
electricity restrained trade in the sale of light bulbs.23 The practice was
included in the tariffs filed by the defendant before the Michigan Public
Service Commission, the state regulatory body having jurisdiction to regu-
late public utilities. The costs to the defendant of the distribution program
were reflected in the rates approved by the commission and charged to the
public.2 4 The trial court2  and the Sixth Circuit 26 both held that the regu-
latory agency's approval of the utility's tariffs exempted the practice from
the antitrust laws pursuant to Parker v. Brown. The Supreme Court re-
versed, ruling that commission approval of the distribution program was
not a sufficient basis for exempting application of the antitrust laws.2 7
The Court looked behind the mere approval by the commission of the
tariffs containing the distribution program. It determined that the state of
Michigan was neutral regarding the regulation of the distribution of light
bulbs, even though the state regulatory agency routinely approved defen-
dant's tariffs which proposed the plan. 28 The Court could find no state
statute authorizing the regulation of the sale and distribution of light
bulbs; further, the statute specifying the regulatory powers of the Michi-
gan Public Service Commission contained no direct reference to light
bulbs.2
Cantor did not involve state action standing alone but rather involved
state authorized private activity. Although the plurality opinion written
by Justice Stevens attempted to limit Parker v. Brown to state activity, a
majority of the justices were not persuaded that Parker did not apply to
sion in the state. The Court noted that no Virginia statute required the setting of fees; rather, the
state supreme court's ethical code mentioned advisory fee schedules. The State Bar issued ethical
opinions pursuant to the Supreme Court's ethical code but the Court found no indication that the
Virginia court formally approved the opinions. Nor did the Court find state compulsion in the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court's regulation of the legal profession reflected in publication of a minimum fee
schedule by the Fairfax County Bar and the schedule's enforcement by the State Bar. Id. at 789-92.
22. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
23. Id. at 581.
24. Id. at 582.
25. 392 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
26. 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975).
27. 428 U.S. at 585.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 584. Justice Stewart, in dissent, disagreed with the majority's finding of neutrality. He
thought it too burdensome to require a state to incorporate regulatory details into statutory law to
insure antitrust immunity. Id. at 626 n.l1, 638-39 n.26.
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private actions authorized by the state, at least in some cases.3 0 In Bates
v. State Bar,s" however, the Supreme Court subsequently stated that the
private nature of the involved activity in Cantor had profoundly affected
the outcome of that case.32
Bates involved a challenge by two Phoenix lawyers to the state discipli-
nary rules prohibiting lawyer advertising. While the Court struck down
the disciplinary rule on first amendment grounds,33 it first considered
whether the antitrust law could reach this kind of activity. For the first
time since Parker, the Court granted antitrust immunity on state action
grounds. The Court characterized the rule prohibiting lawyer advertising
as the "affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court," 3' which
derived its authority for governing the legal profession from the state con-
stitution.83 Thus, the disciplinary rule met the Goldfarb standard, since
the restraint on lawyer advertising was compelled by the state acting in
its sovereign capacity.
The Bates Court took pains to distinguish the Cantor decision. The
Court believed that the Cantor situation differed fundamentally because
the claim there was directed against a private party instead of a public
official or public agency. 6 Further, the Court pointed out that in Cantor
no independent regulatory interest in the marketing of light bulbs existed,
in contrast to the state of Arizona's obligation to protect the public by
controlling the legal profession.37 The allowance of the light bulb distribu-
tion program in Cantor evinced only state acquiescence, whereas the reg-
ulation of the legal profession in Bates through disciplinary rules promul-
gated by the Arizona Supreme Court reflected an affirmative expression
of state policy.38
The Bates Court's assertion that Cantor was distinguishable because a
private rather than a public defendant was involved is troublesome. Ini-
tially, it should be noted that Justice Stevens could only obtain a plurality
in Cantor when attempting to distinguish Parker v. Brown on the same
grounds. 9 Thus, the Bates Court's interpretation of Cantor was appar-
30. See Rogers, supra note I1, at 165-66.
31. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
32. Id. at 361.
33. Id. at 384. The Court ruled that the first amendment prohibited an absolute ban on lawyer
advertising but suggested that some limitations might be constitutionally permissable. Id. See also
Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
34. 433 U.S. at 360.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 361.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 362.
39. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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ently derived from the Cantor plurality rather than the Cantor majority.
Further, the Court in Bates gave no indication why a suit against a pri-
vate party acting pursuant to a legitimate, supervised state regulatory
scheme presents "an entirely different case" than a suit against the public
agency charged with policing the regulated activity."0 Assuming that the
regulation under scrutiny meets the Goldfarb-Bates standard, then the
only additional inquiry mandated by the presence of a private defendant
would seem to be whether the individual's actions were within the scope
of the activity regulated.'
The state's express articulation of regulatory policy and active supervi-
sion of the legal profession in Bates is justifiable reason for distinguishing
Cantor, however, since the state in Cantor was neutral about the regula-
tion of the sale of light bulbs. The distinction supports the laudable
rationale underlying the Parker exemption that states should be permitted
to advance legitimate, controlled regulatory schemes without running
afoul of the antitrust laws.
Another recent Supreme Court decision discussing the state action
exemption, New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,"2 decided af-
ter City of Lafayette, provides further evidence of the Court's position.
Under attack there was the California Automobile Franchise Act, which
required that a prospective automobile dealer secure the approval of the
California New Motor Vehicle Board before opening a dealership in an
area that would compete with an existing dealer if the existing franchise
complained to the board about the prospective competition .4  In denying
plaintiff's antitrust argument, the Court applied the state action exemp-
tion since the regulatory scheme was "a system of regulation, clearly ar-
ticulated and affirmatively expressed, designed to displace unfettered busi-
ness freedom in the matter of the establishment and relocation of
automobile dealerships.""
40. 433 U.S. at 361. Presumably Cantor would have been decided no differently if the Michigan
Public Service Commission had been a party, given the Court's finding of state neutrality on the
regulation of light bulbs. Cantor did not involve a purposeful regulatory scheme.
41. In Cantor the Court articulated a "fairness" test in which antitrust liability would attach to
private parties acting pursuant to state regulation only if the private party exercised sufficient free-
dom of choice in the initiation and enforcement of the activity. 428 U.S. at 593-95. Thus, Cantor
suggests a stricter standard than the one set forth above since a party could be acting within the scope
of a legitimate regulatory scheme, yet still be adjudged liable for antitrust violations because it exer-
cised considerable influence in the promulgation of the regulation. For a discussion of other problems
created by the fairness criterion see Rogers, supra note 11, at 162-63, 167, 171-73.
42. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
43. Id. at 103.
44. Id. at 109. Cf. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (Miller-
Tydings Act did not entitle liquor distributors to enjoin price cutting in absence of contract).
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Most recently in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Mid-
cal Aluminum, Inc.," the Court determined that a California statute re-
quiring wine producers and wholesalers to file with the state fair trade
contracts or price schedules did not qualify for Parker immunity. The
Court refused to grant immunity because although the program was
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy" it was not
"actively supervised" by the state.46 The state simply authorized and en-
forced the prices set by the wineries; it did not establish the prices or
review their reasonableness or control the terms of the fair trade con-
tracts. 7 The Court concluded that Parker does not provide immunity
where a state merely authorizes a violation of the Sherman Act."
It is apparent that the Supreme Court believes that the states have the
right to engage in purposeful, controlled economic regulation at the ex-
pense of unbridled competition. The Court, as signaled by Goldfarb-Can-
tor and most recently in California Retail Liquor, obviously does not in-
tend, however, to permit every activity which can arguably fall under the
rubric of state regulation to avoid antitrust scrutiny.4'9
It is important to note that Parker v. Brown failed to articulate the
quantum of state involvement necessary to insulate state regulated activ-
ity from the antitrust laws.50 Certainly more than official acquiescence is
mandated to immunize any activity from antitrust liability. 1 Goldfarb's
requirement that the state act in its sovereign capacity has been widely
45. 100 S. Ct. 937, 943-44 (1980).
46. Id. at 943, citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.). Although the court cited City of Lafayette for the "active supervi-
sion" requirement it was in reality incorporating of the standard articulated in Bates v. State Bar,
433 U.S. 350 (1977). See notes 74-76 infra and accompanying text.
47. 100 S. Ct. at 943.
48. Id. at 944. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). See also Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389 (1951).
49. Recently, in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978), the Court held
that an alleged conspiracy to refuse to sell insurance was not immunized by the McCarren-Ferguson
Act. The Court specifically pointed out that there had been "no state authorization of the conduct in
question" leaving open the question of whether "the element of state regulatory direction or authori-
zation of the particular practice" might be a defense under the state action doctrine of Parker v.
Brown. Id. at 2936, 2937 n.27.
50. One commentator forcefully argues that although Parker was vague about the amount of
state involvement necessary, the case should nevertheless be used to adopt a per se rule in immunizing
state public utility regulation from antitrust scrutiny. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Anti-
trust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 339-40 (1975). See also Handler,
The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1976). Cf
Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49
N.Y.U.L. REV. 693 (1974); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing
Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71 (1974).
51. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 594 & n.31 (1976).
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interpreted as excluding governmental entrepreneurial activity from im-
munity.6 2 Thus, a state acting in competition with or conjunction with
private enterprise may be held accountable for its antitrust violations.53
On the other hand, a conscious state decision to engage in economic regu-
lation within its borders, coupled with appropriate administrative control
will, as illustrated by Bates and Orrin W. Fox, result in an immunity
from antitrust accountability. 5'
In recognizing the right of states to regulate and, indeed, experiment
with their economies, the Court has really made a policy decision con-
cerning federalism. The Constitution supersedes only state laws which are
contrary to express congressional edicts.55 Little or no evidence exists that
Congress intended the Sherman Act to restrict the states' right to displace
competition." Yet state regulation, at least in areas not concurrently reg-
ulated at the federal level, conflicts with the federal antitrust policy of
maintaining a free market enterprise system. The Supreme Court has de-
termined to give the states wide latitude to make determinations concern-
ing the place and function of competition in the various sectors of their
economies. For example, in Orrin W. Fox the Court expressly recognized
that an adverse effect on competition was not, by itself, enough to invali-
date a state law.57 Thus, the Court made a policy decision, within the
confines of federalism, to give the state virtual regulatory autonomy if
criteria for serious state regulatory activity is met. The effect of this view
52. See, e.g., City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435
U.S. 992 (1978); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated,
435 U.S. 992 (1978), judgment reinstated, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978); Duke & Co. v. Foerster,
521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975).
53. Cf New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974).
54. The standard for immunity has been interpreted to require a clear statement by the legisla-
ture of its intention to displace the antitrust laws (or that such an intention be implicit in the legisla-
tive grant) and active supervision of the regulatory scheme. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92
HARV. L. REV. 57, 282-84 (1978).
55. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Court took notice of the effect of the supremacy
clause of the Constitution (U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2) on state regulatory activity when it noted,
"Occupation of a legislative 'field' by Congress in the exercise of a granted power is a familiar exam-
ple of its constitutional power to suspend state laws." 317 U.S. at 350. The commerce clause has been
judicially expanded so that virtually all state regulatory activities affect interstate commerce and thus
are subject to federal intervention. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc.
v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1948) (overruling United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). See
generally Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1378-82 (1978); Handler, The Cur-
rent Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1976).
56. In Parker the Court could "find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history
which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed
by its legislature." 317 U.S. at 350-51. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 632-34
(1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
57. 439 U.S. 96, 111 (1978).
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of federalism to local governments was then implicitly addressed by the
Court in City of Lafayette.
III. City of Lafayette v. Lousiana Power & Light Co.
As noted, after Goldfarb and Cantor it became apparent that the
Parker v. Brown immunity did not apply to all state government actions.
As a result, lower federal courts became circumspect about granting the
Parker immunity. 8 In particular, grants of antitrust immunity to local
government units were diminished. In Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway &
Park District,69 the Seventh Circuit held that "a subordinate governmen-
tal unit's Parker claim is less obviously justified than is the same claim
made by a state government .... ."6 The Fifth Circuit in City of Lafay-
ette had previously refused to equate cities and states for purposes of de-
termining state action,e" as had the Third Circuit in Duke & Co. v.
Foerster.62
With this background the Supreme Court considered City of Lafayette.
The action arose when two Louisiana cities filed suit against four pri-
vately owned utilities alleging that defendants had conspired to restrain
trade and monopolize the generation, transmission, and distribution of
electric power. 3 Defendant Louisiana Power & Light Co. (LP&L) coun-
terclaimed, claiming that the cities had themselves violated the antitrust
laws in several respects." Upon plaintiff's motion, the district court dis-
missed the counterclaim, holding that cities were immune from antitrust
attack under Parker v. Brown.65 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
municipalities could be exempt from the antitrust laws only if the alleged
anticompetitive activities fell within the intended scope of the powers
granted them by the legislature.66 A sharply divided Supreme Court
affirmed.
58. See, e.g., City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435
U.S. 992 (1978); Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated sub. noma. City of
Impact v..Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992 (1978); City of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 560
F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975).
59. 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), judgment reinstated, 583 F.2d
378 (7th Cir. 1978).
60. Id. at 590.
61. 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976).
62. 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975).
63. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 432 (5th Cir. 1976).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 433.
66. Id. at 436. Cf. Saenz v. University Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973)
(holding that interscholastic league funded, staffed, and operated by State university was governmen-
tal entity exempt from the Sherman Act.).
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The decision came in the form of a plurality opinion by Justice Bren-
nan. Only part I of the three part opinion was joined by a majority.67 The
Court initially declared that municipalities were "persons" and thus met
the jurisdictional requirement of the antitrust laws, whether the munici-
pality is defendant or plaintiff.68 The Court also found that no basis ex-
isted for the argument that Congress intended to exempt local govern-
ment units from the antitrust laws." Further, the Court could point to no
public policy sufficiently important to overcome the strong presumption
against implied exclusions from antitrust enforcement.
7 0
In City of Lafayette, as in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., the Court
could not agree on the scope and meaning of the Parker v. Brown deci-
sion.7 ' The plurality's view was that municipalities are not within the
Parker doctrine since cities are not the sovereign equivalents of states.7
The plurality believed that if local government actions reflected state pol-
icy, however, immunity from antitrust prosecution would attach since mu-
nicipalities are instrumentalities of the states.78 Thus, if the anticompeti-
tive activity of a muncipality is mandated by a state acting in its
sovereign capacity, the Parker exemption would sanction the conduct be-
cause of the state involvement. 7
The plurality would not require specific, particularized legislative dele-
gation of authority for the Parker defense to insulate anticompetitive ac-
tions of a municipality. Quoting the Fifth Circuit, the plurality asserted
that adequate state involvement in municipal activities for purposes of
allowing the Parker exemption is found "from the authority given a gov-
ernmental entity to operate in a particular area, that the legislature con-
67. The plurality included, in addition to Justice Brennan, Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens.
Chief Justice Burger concurred in part I and in the judgment. Justice Marshall, although joining the
plurality, wrote a short concurring statement.. Justice Stewart dissented and was joined by Justices
White, Blackmun (except for Part II-B), and Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun, in addition, wrote a sepa-
rate dissenting statement.
68. 435 U.S. at 394-97. The Court relied on Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203
U.S. 390 (1906), and Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
69. 435 U.S. at 397-408.
70. Id. at 398-408.
71. Although the Court could not agree upon an analysis, the argument that Parker v. Brown
applies with equal force to municipal action was characterized as "petitioners' principal argument."
Id. at 408.
72. Id. at 412, citing Edelman v. Jordan. 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974); Lincoln Co. v. Luning,
133 U.S. 529 (1890). See notes 101-1I, 133-37, 150 infra and accompanying text.
73. 435 U.S. at 413.
74. Presumably municipal activity meeting those standards would satisfy the threshold test set
forth in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975). But see notes 182-85 infra and
accompanying text.
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templated the kind of action complained of."" This articulation of the
Parker doctrine gives municipalities somewhat more room to operate than
a specific delegation requirement, but it leaves uncertain the amount of
state control necessary to immunize municipalities from antitrust attack.
The state must direct or authorize the anticompetitive practice but need
not specifically delegate anticompetitive authority to the cities. 7" Under
this view the freedom of municipalities to violate the antitrust laws pursu-
ant to Parker is dependent upon judicial interpretation of this equivocal
language to an indeterminate number of fact situations.
The Chief Justice concurred in the judgment of the Court because he
believed that the cities were engaged in "business activity. '" He would
apply, for antitrust immunity purposes, a traditional distinction between a
state acting as a sovereign in deciding to displace competition and a state
acting in an entrepreneurial capacity. 8 Unlike the plurality, he would fo-
cus on the nature of the challenged activity, not on the identity of the
parties.79 Thus, a city engaged in activity analogous to private enterprise
should be required to meet the standards for any private party seeking
antitrust immunity under the state action exemption.' 0
The Chief Justice also questioned whether the leeway given the munici-
palities by the plurality is consistent with the standards set forth in Gold-
farb.8" Goldfarb requires that anticompetitive activities be compelled by
the state to qualify for the Parker exclusion.' 2 Following the rationale of
Goldfarb, Burger would require that the state, in deciding to displace
competition, compel the anticompetitive activity."3 He would further re-
quire that the defendant government units show that the activity com-
75. 435 U.S. at 415, quoting 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976).
76. 435 U.S. at 415-17. The recent Supreme Court decision in California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980), seems to suggest that the City of Lafayette
plurality opinion would require active state supervision in addition to legislative contemplation of the
local conduct in order for immunity to attach. It is questionable, however, whether this standard was
meant to apply to political subdivisions as well as to state regulatory programs. See text accompany-
ing notes 226-37 infra.
77. Id. at 418, 425 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
78. Id. at 422 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
79. Id. at 420 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 603-04
(1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
80. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
81. 435 U.S. at 425-26 n.6 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
82. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
83. 435 U.S. at 425-26 n.6 (Burger, C.J., concurring). It would seem doubtful whether any ac-
tions of local governments which are not specifically delegated by the states could meet the compul-
sion standard. In any event the plurality's approval of municipal actions contemplated by the state
would not appear to meet the Goldfarb threshold test. See notes 151-56 infra and accompanying text.
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plained of was essential to the state's regulatory scheme 4
Justice Stewart's dissent expressed the fundamental disagreement
within the Court over the interpretation of Parker v. Brown. 5 Stewart
believes that Parker immunizes all government activity from the antitrust
laws, whether emanating from a state or from a local government unit.86
While Parker draws no distinction between the types of governmental
units, according to Stewart, it does separate government action from pri-
vate action.87 Since the actions of the cities in City of Lafayette were the
actions of government, Stewart felt that Parker should exempt the con-
duct from antitrust scrutiny.
The failure of the Court to agree about the application of the state
action exemption to the activities of municipalities renders predictions
about the impact of City of Lafayette difficult. The views of the plurality,
the Chief Justice, and Justice Stewart exhibit fundamental disagreement.
The discord appears to be on at least two planes: (1) differing conceptions
of federalism and (2) differing policy attitudes. Perhaps by exploring the
policy and federalism underpinnings of the positions taken, a better un-
derstanding of the future of antitrust liability for municipalities can be
attained.
Initially, it should be noted that a majority of the Court did agree on
one policy pronouncement. The Court refused to imply an exclusion from
the reach of the antitrust laws to local government units, apart from con-
sideration of whether the Parker immunity extends to municipalities in
their role as agents of the state.88 The policy determination that munici-
palities, standing alone, should not be immune was thus distinct from the
considerations of federalism which underscore Parker v. Brown. Rather,
the Court, wary of implying exceptions to the antitrust policy of unfet-
tered competition, considered whether any of the policy arguments put
forth by the cities were sufficient to outweigh the application of antitrust
standards.89
84. 435 U.S. at 425-26 n.6 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
85. Since Justices White, Rehnquist, and Blackmun (all but Part II-B) joined Justice Stewart's
dissent, his opinion garnered as many votes as the plurality.
86. 435 U.S. at 428 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 429 (Stewart, J., dissenting). This was the interpretation of Parker v. Brown set forth
by the plurality in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 591-92 & n.24 (1976), and adopted
by the Court in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977). See notes 36-41 supra and.accompany-
ing text.
88. 435 U.S. at 400-08.
89. The Court noted that a presumption against implied exemptions to the antitrust laws existed
unless it could be shown that the regulatory provisions were plainly repugnant to the antitrust laws.




Initially, the Court rejected the cities' contention that it would be
anomalous to impose criminal and civil liabilities on municipalities, noting
that cities have had to comply with other federal laws which impose simi-
lar sanctions upon "persons."90 Next, the Court rejected the argument
that municipalities should be exempt from antitrust law because their ac-
tions serve the public welfare and are not tantamount to private abuses of
power.91 The Court found that a municipality might be said to act to
benefit its citizens, perhaps at the expense of non-residents. Thus, the
Court concluded that local government policy choices are no more likely
to take into account national economic well-being than are decisions of
corporations seeking to advance the interests of their shareholders." The
additional argument that antitrust scrutiny of municipalities was unneces-
sary because municipalities are subject to the political process was also
rejected. The Court observed that nonresidents injured by municipal utili-
ties have no political redress except at the state level. 9" Access to state
legislatures was a right shared by anyone aggrieved by the anticompeti-
tive conduct of any corporation; further, Congress, by enacting the Sher-
man Act, articulated a broad policy mandating a competitive business
economy which was to be administered by the neutral judiciary and not
left "to the vagaries of the political process." '9 4 The Court concluded that
the national policy of protecting competition would be significantly hin-
dered if the thousands of local government units were free to advance
their individual interests at the expense of an open market economy.95
It is important to recognize that, even while considering the policy ar-
guments of the cities, the Court had principles of federalism in mind. The
Court initially pointed out that in the only two instances in which it has
been persuaded to override the presumption against implied antitrust ex-
emptions "potential conflict with policies of signal importance in our na-
tional traditions and governmental structure of federalism" were appar-
ent." In Parker v. Brown, states were given immunity because the Court
recognized the sovereignty of states under the Constitution and refused to
infer from Congress an intent, through enactment of the Sherman Act, to
circumvent the authority of states to exercise dominion over their officers
and agents. 97 The second implied exemption from antitrust, the so-called
90. 435 U.S. at 400-02.
91. Id. at 403.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 406.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 408.
96. Id. at 400.
97. Id. In Parker. the Court had stated that "an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
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Noerr-Pennington exemption which protects private attempts to influence
governmental activities," is based on the policy of maintaining the open
communication between government and its constituents necessary to as-
sure the proper functioning of a representative democracy.99 Equally im-
portant in protecting the ability of private persons to affect government
decision-making is the constitutionally safeguarded right of petition.100
The cities in City of Lafayette were unable to raise any arguments
which would provide municipalities with the type of fundamental policy
principles necessary to overcome the federal design to foment competition.
Municipalities lack constitutional standing as a sovereign apart from their
relationship with states and no other argument sufficed to convince the
Court that competition should be displaced. 10 1 Indeed, the Court seemed
to believe that policy demanded that the antitrust laws apply to local gov-
ernment units to protect against "economic choices counseled solely by
[municipalities'] own parochial interests and without regard to their an-
ticompetitive effects." 102
It should be apparent then that the Court's policy deliberations con-
cerning antitrust exemptions cannot be divorced from the principles of
federalism. The promotion of competition is, of course, a federal policy.103
In order to displace this policy by granting an exemption from the anti-
trust laws, the Supreme Court must be convinced that contravening poli-
cies grounded in the federalist system of government are paramount.104
As noted, the Court was not persuaded in City of Lafayette that such
policy arguments exist for municipalities.
IV. MUNICIPALITIES AND FEDERALISM
The implications of City of Lafayette about the place of political subdi-
visions of states in our dual system of government are readily apparent
when one considers the plurality's position that a different standard must
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 317 U.S. at 351.
98. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The relationship of the Noerr-Pennington immunity to the state
action doctrine is discussed in Rogers, supra note 11, at 169-73. See generally Fishel, Antitrust Lia-
bility for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 80 (1977).
99. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 399 (1978).
100. Id.
101. See text accompanying notes 88-95, supra.
102. 435 U.S. at 408.
103. Id. at 398. See also United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-35 (1948).
104. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text.
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
FEDERALIST SYSTEM
be applied to exempt cities, as opposed to states, from the antitrust laws.
The plurality believed that municipalities are not sovereign and are not
entitled to the constitutional respect accorded the states.10 5 In contrast,
Justice Stewart, in dissent, considered the actions of municipalities to be
an exercise of state sovereignty'" and pointed out that states and munici-
palities have been given similar constitutional constructions in other con-
texts. 107 Justice Stewart viewed the Court's decision as severely restricting
the right of states to function autonomously within the federalist system
since it impaired the ability of states to delegate governmental authority
to subordinate government bodies without express legislative approval. 08
Thus, under Stewart's analysis, the plurality's position constricts states' as
well as cities' independence in self-government.
Although Justice Stewart recognized that municipal governments de-
rive their sovereign nature from the states, he would grant cities antitrust
immunity regardless of the involvement of the state in the local activities.
To Stewart, the question of municipal immunity from the antitrust laws
was one of statutory interpretation which, he asserted, the Supreme Court
resolved in Parker v. Brown.'00 There the Court decided that Congress
intended the Sherman Act to apply to private and not governmental ac-
tion. 1 0 Since any action by a political subdivision is government action,
Stewart concluded that Parker v. Brown confers antitrust immunity to
local government units."'
Stewart also took issue with the plurality's reliance on eleventh amend-
ment cases to establish the existence of different sovereign attributes of
cities and states,"' instead declaring that the Court's decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery" s was apposite if a constitutional perspective
was necessary.""
National League of Cities involved an action challenging the constitu-
tionality of the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which
extended the coverage of federal minimum wage and maximum hour
standards to virtually all public employees of states and their political
105. 435 U.S. at 412.
106. Id. at 430 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 430 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 434-35, 438 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 428-29 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
110. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
111. 435 U.S. at 428-29 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 430 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974);
Lincoln Co. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). See generally Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh
Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 139 (1977).
113. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
114. 435 U.S. at 430 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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subdivisions."' The Court, while recognizing that the wage and hour
standards were, standing alone, within the scope of authority granted
Congress under the commerce clause, nevertheless, held that the amend-
ments were an unconstitutional intrusion upon the sovereignty of state
and local governments." 6 According to the Court, Congress cannot inter-
fere with "functions essential to separate and independent existence" of
the states under the federalist model of government.117 The labor provi-
sions interfered with the right of states to decide the terms and conditions
of employment of public servants thereby "displac(ing) state policies re-
garding the manner in which they will structure delivery of those govern-
mental services which their citizens require."118 The Court viewed the
states' power to determine the wages of its employees as an "undoubted
attribute of state sovereignty."" "
It is important to note that the Parker v. Brown decision did involve
statutory interpretation of the Sherman Act, as Justice Stewart sug-
gested.120 The Court, looking to the language and legislative history of the
Act, could find no evidence of congressional intent to apply the antitrust
law to restrain state activities. The statutory analysis in Parker was un-
dertaken with federalist principles foremost in mind, however. The Court
assumed, without deciding, that Congress could prohibit the state prorate
115. 426 U.S. at 837-39. The Act as originally enacted expressly exempted states and their subdi-
visions from the definition of "employer." Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060
(amended 1966, 1974). The exemption was partially removed by the 1966 amendments, with respect
to employees of state hospitals, schools, and institutions. Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat. 830
(amended 1974). The 1966 amendments were upheld in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
National League of Cities expressly overruled that decision. 426 U.S. at 855. The 1974 amendments
defined state and local governments as "public agencies," 29 U.S.C. § 203(x) (Supp. 1975), and
"public agencies" as "employers," id. at § 203(d), thereby subjecting virtually all remaining state and
local government employees to the federal wage and hour standards of the Act.
116. 426 U.S. at 841, 852. The decision was the first Supreme Court holding in 40 years to rule
that a congressional regulation of commerce was an unconstitutional intrusion upon the sovereignty of
state and local governments. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). See also Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. i, 298
U.S. 513 (1936). While the amendments were within the authority of Congress to regulate com-
merce, the question in National League of Cities was whether the power to regulate was overridden
because the amendments applied to states and their political subdivisions directly. 426 U.S. 833, 841-
42. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
117. 426 U.S. at 845, quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911), quoting Lane Co. v.
Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868). See also 426 U.S. at 851-52.
118. Id. at 847.
119. Id. at 845. Justice Brennan, in dissent, had strong doubts about such "sovereign" states
rights. Id. at 863-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Note, Federal Securities Fraud Liability
and Municipal Issuers: Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1064, 1067-70 (1977).
120. See 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
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program through exercise of its commerce powers.1" But since the state,
under our dual system of government, is a sovereign, the C6urt refused to
permit federal infringement into a state's authority to order its business,
absent an express congressional intent to do so.' 22 Thus, the Court's inter-
pretation of the Sherman Act in Parker was influenced by the fact of
state sovereignty.
The Court looked into the nature of the prorate program to assure itself
that the program evinced the state's use of its sovereign power. In doing
so, the Court recognized that a state has the right to impose a restraint as
an act of government but cannot merely permit individuals to violate the
antitrust laws. 2 Thus, a critical difference exists in Parker between pur-
poseful state regulatory action to displace competition and state acquies-
cence or consent to anticompetitive conduct. 24
Consideration of the federalist underpinnings of Parker and National
League of Cities reveal the appropriate analytical framework. In Na-
tional League of Cities, unlike Parker, Congress did expressly undertake
to interfere with a state function, the setting of wages and hours for state
and municipal employees, through use of its commerce power. The Court
found that the federal amendments impermissably interfered with the in-
tegral governmental functions of states and were thus an unconstitutional
use of Congress' commerce clause authority. 5 If in Parker Congress had
acted expressly to prohibit state agricultural stabilization programs the
Court would have confronted the precise issue it later did in National
League of Cities.2 If the stabilization program were found to be an exer-
cise of an "integral" or "traditional" government function, the Congres-
sional enactment would presumably give way to principles of state sover-
eignty, as in National League of Cities.2
121. Id. at 350.
122. Id. at 351.
123. Id. at 351. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) where
the Court ruled that a retail price maintenance program authorized by a state fair trade law violated
the Sherman Act. See Rogers, supra note I1, at 154-59; Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance, State
Action and the Antitrust Laws: Effect of Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers, 46 ILL. L. REV.
349 (1951).
124. See Handler, Antitrust-1978. 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1382 (1978).
125. 426 U.S. 833, 851-52. The Court listed fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public
health, and parks and recreation as illustrative of traditional government activities. Id. at 851.
126. The Parker Court assumed, but did not decide, that Congress could usurp the state pro-
grams through exercise of its commerce power. 317 U.S. at 350.
127. A raisin stabilization program does not, at first blush, appear to be either an integral or
traditional government service. The question becomes closer if the state were acting to protect a class
of beleaguered farm producers, rather than merely responding to strong lobbying efforts to protect an
already viable industry. This suggests that questions of governmental purpose or intent might be
determinative where state sovereignty is at issue.
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Taken together, Parker and National League of Cities illustrate the
appropriate analysis of federal-state conflict problems. First, a determina-
tion of the area of conflict must be judicially determined.2 8 Next the
Court must interpret the federal statute to determine whether Congress
intended to preempt state law. If no preemptive intent, either express or
implied,"2 9 is found, the Court should then look to the nature of the state
law. If the state acted in its sovereign capacity to further a legitimate
state interest, presumably the state law will stand, even though it conflicts
with or renders ineffective federal policy." 0
If, on the other hand, the Court determines that Congress intended the
federal law to be exclusive, the state law must be found to be an integral
or traditional governmental function to survive."' Arguably, the standard
a state must meet to assert its sovereignty when Congress intended to
usurp state policy or state law is more stringent than if no such intent is
found. That is, the integral/traditional test of National League of Cities
applies to a narrower scope of state governmental activities than permit-
ted the state under Parker. As noted, the raisin prorate program of
Parker could hardly be said to be an integral governmental function, even
though it resulted from the legislative mandate of a state.' 3'
The disagreement among the members of the Court in City of
Layfayette centers, in a constitutional perspective, around the question of
when the activities of political subdivisions are free from federal antitrust
intrusion because of their relationship with the sovereign states. Justice
Stewart would have applied the holdings in National League of Cities
and Parker to municipal government conduct while Justice Brennan ar-
128. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941). See generally Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164, 1167-69
(1975).
129. The subject matter of a statute may evince federal exclusivity or the need for uniformity.
See Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973)(noise regulation by CAB); Perez
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (197 1)(discharge from bankruptcy). Cf. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil
Co., 99 S. Ct. 1096 (1979)(patent law does not preempt state contract law); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)(patent law does not preempt state trade secret laws); Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973)(copyright laws do not preempt state record piracy laws). Or the
federal scheme may be so comprehensive and pervasive that state regulation is precluded. Local 496,
Nat'l Assoc. Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)(labor laws); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964)(state unfair competition law preempted by patent law); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)(same).
130. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). See also
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1960).
131. But cf Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947) (given preemptive intent,
less pervasive federal regulatory plan will prevail ever state scheme).
132. See note 127 supra. See also Davidson & Butters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitu-




gued that those cases do not necessarily presage equal constitutional
treatment for local governments.
Specifically, Brennan pointed out that Lincoln County v. Luningjss long
ago established that political subdivisions are not themselves sovereign.134
National League of Cities did not hold otherwise and was not relevant, he
asserted, in view of the plurality's position that municipalities are exempt
from the antitrust laws to the same extent as the state itself when acting
as a state agency in pursuance of state policy.1'3 Likewise, in Brennan's
view, Parker does not automatically extend to municipalities because the
actions of a city may not always reflect the sovereign interest or command
of the state."" According to him, the exemption granted the states in
Parker was grounded upon principles of sovereignty which do not necessa-
rily extend to municipalities."s7
It is noteworthy that the Chief Justice in his concurring opinion also
assumed that National League of Cities was relevant in the state action
antitrust context. In his view, the qualities of state sovereignty which at-
tached when the state's interest involved "functions essential to separate
and independent existence" were not present in City of Lafayette since
the supplying of electric service was merely a business enterprise, not a
traditional prerogative of the state and not essential to the operation of
the government.13 8 Thus, municipal regulatory or proprietary conduct pre-
sumably would not be protected from federal interference by National
League of Cities.
Burger also noted that the concept of federalism embodied in National
League of Cities closely resembled the language in Parker v. Brown. 39
Each recognized that states had certain sovereign attributes derived from
the Constitution which may not be congressionally vitiated. 40 According
to Burger, however, the proprietary enterprises of municipalities, such as
the running of a public utility, did not constitute one of the inalienable
133. 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
134. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 & n.42 (1978).
135. Id. at 412-13 n.42.
136. Id. at 412-13.
137. Id. at 411-12.
138. Id. at 423-24 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (supplying of electric service not traditionally the prerogative of the state);
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-86 (1936) (state's operation of a railroad subject to
federal regulation). Justice Stewart viewed the distinction between "proprietary" and "governmental"
activities as a "quagmire" and "virtually impossible to determine." 435 U.S. at 433 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65-68 (1955).
139. 435 U.S. at 423 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
140. Compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976), with Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
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sovereign rights. Thus, he concluded that Parker and National League of
Cities could not constitutionally immunize the municipal conduct in City
of Lafayette.'"
Parker, National League of Cities, and City of Lafayette each involved
a conflict between federal policy expressed by acts of Congress and state
economic autonomy. In each, the Court was cognizant of the rights of the
states to make certain kinds of decisions Without federal interference. It is
problematical, however, whether Parker and National League of Cities
support Justice Stewart's contention in City of Lafayette that municipali-
ties have the same sovereign attributes as do the states.
Parker, for example, did not expressly h6ld that the activities of munic-
ipalities should be automatically exempt from the antitrust laws. At one
point in Parker, however, the Court did suggest that local governments
may be the legal equivalents of the states .14  There the Court pointed out
that either states or their political subdivisions could become a participant
in a private combination to restrain trade. 4  But this recognition by the
Parker Court falls short of an unequivocal assertion of equal antitrust
treatment, as suggested by Justice Stewart. The statement is, to the con-
trary, in the negative; states and cities can be subjected to antitrust liabil-
ity by participating in a private conspiracy to restrain trade.
Further, even if Parker could be stretched to confer antitrust immunity
to municipal governments, the holding would amount to nothing more
than dictum. Parker involved a suit against state agencies and state offi-
cials conducting a state mandated raisin prorate program, not a suit
against a unit of local government. 44 Thus, it is more accurate to say that
Parker failed to consider the application of its antitrust exemption to mu-
nicipalities, particularly in view of its one uncertain reference to local
governments.
Parker did, as Justice Stewart asserted, draw a distinction between
141. Burger recognized however that state regulation of a utility pursuant to a state command to
avoid unrestrained competition would be immune from antitrust attack under Parker. 435 U.S. at
424-25 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The critical distinction, to Burger, was "the difference between a
State's entrepreneurial personality and a sovereign's decision.- as in Parker - to replace competi-
tion with regulation." Id. at 422 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Thus, a municipality's proprietary enter-
prise, as the municipal conduct in City of Lafayette was characterized, could not qualify for immu-
nity from the Sherman Act unless it was part of a state regulatory scheme to displace or temper
competition. Id. at 424-25 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
142. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
143. Id. Presumably, this language refers to the possibility that a governmental body may, in an
entrepreneurial capacity, become entangled in an agreement with private industry that unlawfully
restrains trade.
144. Id. at 344.
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governmental action and private action.14 5 As noted, however, Parker did
not involve a suit against a municipality. Stewart attempted to expand the
obvious federalist predicate of Parker uniformly to municipalities when
the decision in Parker hinged upon the sovereignty of the states. " 6 The
plurality position that municipalities are free from antitrust scrutiny when
engaged in activity contemplated by the state, not when acting indepen-
dently of the state, reflects a more realistic analysis and application of
Parker to local government units.
In National League of Cities, the Court sought to protect the freedom
of the states "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional gov-
ernmental functions.' 7 The Court specifically included essential local
government functions within the constitutionally protected sphere. But
this protection was extended to municipalities because of their relation-
ship with states. The application of the Fair Labor Standards amend-
ments to political subdivisions was objectionable only because it infringed
upon the ability of the states to make fundamental decisions about provid-
ing traditional government services.148
The National League of Cities Court did characterize "integral govern-
mental services" provided by local government units as beyond the range
of Congress under the commerce clause "just as if such services were pro-
vided by the State itself.'1 49 Nonintegral municipal services are subject to
federal intrusion just as are nonintegral state governmental functions. For
example, in City of Lafayette the actions of the cities in owning and oper-
ating electric utility systems may not be deemed "integral". 50 In that
145. Id. at 352.
146. See id. at 350-51.
147. 426 U.S. at 852.
148. The Court stated that congressional prescription of minimum wages to be paid and maxi-
mum hours to be worked by state and municipal employees "would impair the States' 'ability to
function effectively in a federal system.'" Id., quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7
(1975). Congress had overstepped its authority, according to the Court, because the amendments
would "significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships
in such areas as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation."
426 U.S. at 851. The states' power to determine employees' wages and hours was characterized as an
"undoubted attribute of state sovereignty" which was necessary for the state's "separate and indepen-
dent existence." Id. at 845, 851, quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911), quoting Lane Co.
v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868).
149. 426 U.S. at 855-56 n.20. At the same time, the Court noted that political subdivisions "de-
rive their authority and power from their respective States." Id.
150. In United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 182 (1936), the operation of a railroad by a
state was held subject to federal regulation. The National League of Cities Court pointed out that
operation of a railroad is not an integral state governmental function and thus should not be immune
from Congressional intetference. 426 U.S. at 854 n.18. Thus, the operation of an electrical utility by
a municipality, even under express authority of the state, would be subject to congressional control
unless judically determined to be an integral government function.
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instance, the Louisiana cities would lose their ability to forestall express
congressional intervention, according to National League of Cities.
Thus, while National League of Cities does extend the sovereign attrib-
utes of states to cities because of their relationship with the states, it must
be remembered that the grant of sovereignty to each is unequivocally lim-
ited. Since it is unlikely that Parker confers blanket antitrust immunity
on municipalities, Parker and National League of Cities together do not
support Stewart's argument that all municipal actions should be immune
from federal encroachment through the antitrust laws.
In contrast, the plurality's position appears to reflect more accurately
the federalist principles of the two cases. Local government services found
to be "integral" will usually have been adopted pursuant to state authori-
zation and be reflective of state policy.151 The National League of Cities
Court seemingly recognizes this limitation when it asserts that municipali-
ties are entitled to sovereign treatment because they "derive their author-
ity and power from their respective States.""" Further, the plurality's ex-
pansion of Parker to provide municipal immunity only when the local
activities were contemplated by the state pursuant to authority given to
local governments is consistent with the obvious deference shown by the
Parker Court to state regulatory decision-making.
The plurality, in extending Parker to cover municipalities only when
acting in furtherance of state policy to displace competition, may appear
to have implicitly equated the reach of the state action immunity with the
scope of constitutional protection afforded the states.1" At least superfi-
cially, equating state sovereignty with antitrust immunity appears sound
since each represents state resistance to federal policy. " 4 Indeed, Parker
v. Brown treated the application of antitrust to the states as a problem
involving federalist principles.155 The subsequent development of the im-
151. A difficulty with such an analysis is that an "integral" local government function may not be
authorized by the state in the "contemplation" sense required by the City of Lafayette plurality. Thus
there may be a difference between an "integral" municipal activity and an explicitly authorized one.
See Jordan v. Mills, 473 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1979) and text accompanying notes 215-26 infra.
152. 426 U.S. at 856 n.20. But see notes 194-98 infra and accompanying text.
153. Justice Stewart, on the other hand, states that constitutional protection afforded to munici-
palities varies according to the factual and legal context. 435 U.S. at 430 & n.7. However, he be-
lieved that the appropriate constitutional analogy when considering possible municipal antitrust liabil-
ity was National League of Cities, since both it and City of Lafayette involved the reach of
congressional power under the commerce clause. Id. at 430. According to Justice Stewart, National
League of Cities held that states and political subdivisions are entitled to equal constitutional defer-
ence. Id. Thus, Justice Stewart equated the state action antitrust doctrine with state sovereignty.
154. That is, it would appear that state immunity from the antitrust laws is a specific application
of the general principle of state sovereignty.
155. The Parker Court assumed, without deciding, that Congress had the power to suspend a
state program such as the California raisin prorate plan, as long as it acted expressly to do so. 317
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munity further paralleled judicial attitudes toward state sovereignty. In
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the Court limited the Parker immunity to
acts compelled by the state acting as sovereign. 15 Thus, it is logical that
any extension of the Parker antitrust immunity to municipalities must, as
a minimum requirement, rest on sovereign precepts.
However, the Goldfarb interpretation of the state action antitrust ex-
ception may mean that state antitrust immunity does not extend to the
full breadth of state sovereignty, since Goldfarb presumably indicates
that a state can act as a sovereign by merely prompting or authorizing,
and not compelling, acts by state officials.' 57 According to Goldfarb,
Parker does not apply to sovereign acts not compelled by the state. " ' The
apparent disparity between state sovereignty and the state action antitrust
immunity is heightened by the position taken by Justice Stevens' plurality
opinion in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.1" Stevens viewed Goldfarb as a
refusal to guarantee "that compliance with any state requirement would
automatically confer federal antitrust immunity."'' 10
As noted, however, both the plurality and dissent in City of Lafayette
seem to implicitly equate the notion of state sovereignty with the expanse
of the state action antitrust immunity, at least for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the immunity should extend to municipal government ac-
tions. Arguably, federalist principles require that, at a minimum, munici-
pal actions reflect state sovereignty in some way to qualify for antitrust
immunity. Certainty, if a state or its political subdivision is acting as an
entrepreneur there are strong policy arguments, within the principles of
federalism, that anticompetitive acts of the body should be subject to anti-
trust enforcement."' Further, since municipal governments are creations
of the state, it is logical that any concept of local government sovereignty
must be derived from the state.'62 Municipal activities that are not deriva-
U.S. at 350. Thus Parker is not inconsistent with National League of Cities since the Court only
assumed that Congress could strike down a state regulatory plan and did not consider whether the
plan was an integral government function. However, neither could Parker arguably be precedent for
National League of Cities.
156. 421 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1975).
157. Id. at 791. It is important to note that Goldfarb characterized the test it articulated for
determining if state action is beyond the reach of the Sherman Act as only "the threshold inquiry."
Id. at 790.
158. Id. at 790-91.
159. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
160. Id. at 600. Cantor, of course, concerned state authorized private activity. See notes 22-30
supra and accompanying text.
161. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 403-08, 415-16
(1978).
162. See id. at 412; National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855-56 n.20 (1976);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974); Lincoln Co. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890);
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tive from states would not be spared federal regulation since those activi-
ties have no independent constitutionally recognized status.1 63
The plurality position giving municipalities immunity for activities con-
templated by the states, while in fundamental disagreement with the dis-
sent's blanket grant of immunity to local governments, still may expand
the boundaries of permissable state action. The Court in Goldfarb had
posited the requirement that anticompetitive activities must be compelled
by the state to qualify for antitrust immunity.1" Although the compulsion
standard of Goldfarb has been distinguished as applying only to state au-
thorized private conduct, 1" the Goldfarb Court viewed the requirement
as having arisen in Parker itself, a case involving a state regulatory pro-
gram.166 In City of Lafayette, where municipal action was challenged, the
plurality largely ignored the compulsion standard'17 and used such terms
as "authorization," "contemplation," and "direction" to describe the
requisite state involvement for antitrust immunity. 6
The plurality's flexible standard, which succeeds in transferring the sov-
ereignty of the states to an uncertain amount of municipal activities,
seemingly reflects a policy choice to continue to give the states wide lati-
tude to regulate. Since the typical state grant of authority to political
subdivisions may not include specific delegations of power or acts of state
compulsion, the plurality, by using imprecise language, has recognized the
right of the states to give general regulatory power to their municipalities.
The limits of that right will be determined by subsequent litigation.'"
Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287 (1883).
163. In another context, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court held that Congress
did not intend to bring municipal corporations within section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
because Congress doubted that it could constitutionally impose any obligation upon municipalities. Id.
at 190. In Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court overruled Monroe
v. Pape. and stated that "the doctrine of dual sovereignty apparently put no limit on the power of
federal courts to enforce the Constitution against municipalities that violated it." Id. at 680. The
Monell Court specifically limited its analysis "to local government units which are not considered part
of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes," thus making National League of Cities v. Usery
irrelevant to its holding. Id. at 690 n.54.
164. 421 U.S. at 791.
165. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 431-32 (1978) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
166. 421 U.S. at 790-91.
167. The Court did note that the Parker requirement that the state "command" anticompetitive
activity could not be met unless the state authorized or directed the municipal action. 435 U.S. at
414, citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
168. 435 U.S. at 414-16. See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 553,
554 n.27 (1978).
169. Not surprisingly, the lower courts have registered uncertainty thus far in applying City of
Lafayette to municipal conduct. One court noted that since no legislative history accompanied the
applicable state statute, it was difficult to determine whether the municipal conduct was contemplated
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In contrast, the sovereignty principles of National League of Cities
may often fail to equal the breadth of the state action antitrust immunity.
The National League of Cities Court emphasized that state sovereign
precepts attached to integral government services "which the States and
their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens."'7 0
Undue emphasis on traditional governmental operations may limit the
ability of the states to function free from federal interference. Areas of
government activity may change and progress as the needs of the citi-
zenry change. A particular governmental function may be a necessary
and legitimate exercise of a state's governing authority without being
traditional;' 7 ' but, under a strict reading of the National League of Cities
rationale, the activity would be subject to possible federal interference.
Certainly the state action antitrust exemption may apply to state gov-
ernmental services that are not considered traditional. This disparity
would affect municipalities since nontraditional governmental functions
delegated by the states to local government units would presumably qual-
ify for the state action exemption but would not otherwise be exempt
from federal regulation. Thus, the sovereignty standard of National
League of Cities should be significantly narrower than the state action
antitrust immunity.
7 2
by the legislature, as required by City of Lafayette. Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Servs. Inc.,
476 F. Supp. 543, 551 (M.D.N.C. 1979). The cases granting local governments immunity have taken
a rather broad view of the delegation of authority to municipalities. See Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City
of Rochester, 1979-2 Trade Cas. $ 62,735 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Cedar-Riverside Assocs., Inc. v. United
States, 459 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Minn. 1978). See also Shrader v. Horton, 471 F. Supp. 1236 (W.D.
Va. 1979); Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301, 1311-15 (E.D. Mich.
1979). In contrast, the cases denying antitrust immunity have required more specific state authoriza-
tion and supervision. See Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp 737 (N.D.
Iowa 1979). See also Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Servs., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C.
1979); Winters v. Indiana & Mich. Electric Co., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 62,797 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
170. 426 U.S. at 855 (emphasis added).
171. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 591 (1946) where Justice Douglas, dissent-
ing, pointed out, "A State's project is as much a legitimate governmental activity whether it is tradi-
tional, or akin to private interprise, or conducted for profit . . . .What might have been viewed in an
earlier day as an improvident or even dangerous extension of state activities may today be deemed
indispensable." See also Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery - The Commerce Power and
State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORD. L. REv. 1115, 1129 (1978).
172. Another possibility is that National League of Cities could be applied to traditional munici-
pal services not sufficiently delegated by the state to qualify for antitrust immunity. See notes 215-27
infra and accompanying text. See also Jordan v. Mills, 473 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
Examination of National League of Cities in this light raises the interesting question of whether
Congress, through the exercise of its commerce power, could amend the Sherman Act to specifically
include state governmental functions within its coverage, thus denying the states the benefits of the
Parker immunity. It would seem that under National League of Cities such congressional action
would be permissible only to the extent that traditional state decisions relating to integral governmen-
tal functions were unaffected. See generally Davidson & Butters, supra note 132.
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It is important to remember, however, that National League of Cities
involved an express congressional mandate to replace state control over
minimum wages and maximum hours of state and local government em-
ployees. In contrast, express congressional intent to replace state regula-
tory authority through enactment of the Sherman Act was found want-
ing."'3 It should not be surprising that wider latitude is permitted states
when acting contrary to a general federal policy not specifically intended
to usurp state functions than when states run afoul of congressional enact-
ments directed expressly at them.
Although City of Lafayette has been hailed as a significant defeat for
municipalities, eight members of the Court, representing the plurality and
dissent, favor, in varying degrees, the grant of significant antitrust immu-
nity to local government activities. The plurality's uncertain criteria for
municipal immunity reflects, at the least, continued judicial deference to
the rights of the states to order their economies. The dissent would extend
that deference to political subdivisions irrespective of state involvement.
The disagreement of the Court, as shown, centers around different views
of federalism. 174 Contrary policy arguments implicitly underscore the fed-
eralism conflicts and differing interpretations of cases such as Parker and
National League of Cities, however.
Although both sides agree that states have a significant, relatively au-
tonomous role in the government, they appear to have conflicting percep-
tions of the ability of local governments to act responsibly and the ability
of states to effectively control their activities by broad grants of power.
The cities were unable to persuade a majority of the Court that policy
considerations mandated automatic antitrust immunity for municipali-
ties.175 The plurality's further refusal to extend immunity to the cities
because of their relationship with the states reflects, in part, the same
distrust of municipal accountability, particularly where "parochial" en-
trepreneural enterprises are involved.1 76 It also reflects a policy determi-
nation that states be made to exercise substantial dominion over munici-
palities to resist federal encroachment. The dissent, in arguing that
municipalities have constitutional parity with the states, impliedly as-
serted that cities, as a matter of policy, should be free from antitrust chal-
lenge. The dissent believed that the plurality position will substantially
173. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943) the court stated: "We find nothing in the
language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state
or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature."
174. See notes 131-41 supra and accompanying text.
175. 435 U.S. at 397-408.
176. Id. at 408, 415-16.
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interfere with the right of the states to broadly delegate governmental
authority to political subdivisions. 17 7 Sovereign principles should preclude
federal intrusion into the state's granting and delegation of authority to
local government units, according to the dissent. This position also reflects
a policy decision that states should be permitted to exercise their author-
ity over their political subdivisions without federal supervision. Presum-
ably, municipal behavior would be solely for the states to scrutinize. Fed-
eral policy choices would then give way to state policy choices, if a
sovereign state function is involved.
Justice Stewart presupposes that states will always exercise authority
over their political subdivisions. Given the broad ranging, but parochial,
nature of municipal concerns, unflagging state supervision is unlikely. 78
And given the lack of policy reasons and legal basis for municipal auton-
omy, it is arguably preferable that both the federal and state governments
be able to exercise control over local government actions in a manner that
does not interfere with state sovereignty.
V. THE EFFECTS OF City of Lafayette ON MUNICIPAL ACTIVITIES
Thus far this article has mentioned, without really focusing on, the ef-
fect that City of Lafayette will likely have on the myriad of activities
engaged in by municipalities. 17 ' As discussed earlier, the state action anti-
trust immunity, even as applied to municipalities, exceeds the sovereign
prerogatives of the states as espoused in National League of Cities."s0 The
plurality in City of Lafayette sought to place definable limits on the reach
177. Id. at 438 (Stewart, J., dissenting). According to the plurality, the dissent engaged in pure
"hyperbole." Id. at 416. Justice Brennan believed that the states would still be able to allocate gov-
ernmental power to municipalities. The result reached by the Court only meant that municipalities
must obey the antitrust laws "when the State itself has not directed or authorized an anticompetitive
practice." Id.
178. The activities that municipalities engage in are as wide ranging as one's imagination. In
Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 992
(1978), judgment reinstated, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), an arm of a local government was
charged with conspiring to fix prices at pro shops located on five municipal golf courses. The park
districts were apparently attempting to enrich themselves by coercing licensed concessionaires at the
courses to fix retail prices. 557 F.2d at 585. On a lighter note, the town of Visalia, California, re-
cently purchased a minor league baseball franchise, sharing operating expenses with the major league
Minnesota Twins, who supply the players under an affiliation agreement. See Lancaster, Hey, Charlie
Finley, Here's a Ball Club With 40.000 Bosses, Wall St. J., June 15, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
179. As noted, the extent of the control depends on the nature of the conduct involved as well as
the nature of the federal law. Express federal directives could be usurped only by the state's delega-
tion of traditional or integral governing authority to its political underlings. See notes 131-32 supra
and accompanying text. General federal policy may be more easily circumvented by state delegation
or authorization of contrary regulatory action. See notes 125-30 supra and accompanying text.
180. See note 169 supra and accompanying text.
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of the immunity to the actions of local governments.
Certainly, the right of states to delegate governing authority to political
subdivisions is a sovereign right. But it is the delegation or authorization
by the states pursuant to a state policy to displace competition' 8 that is
the focal point for scrutinizing municipal antitrust susceptibility.
Municipal liability depends on the nature of the governmental activity
in respect to the grant of authority by the state. According to the City of
Lafayette plurality, the local activity must be of the kind "contemplated"
by the legislature. 8 2 Thus, in order to discern the legislature's contempla-
tion, the type of municipal activity involved must be compared to the type
of state authorization. 83
Concentration on these two variables should provide some measure of
predictability to what appears to be a purposefully flexible standard. 84 It
will also, however, serve to illustrate that the plurality approach creates
excessive antitrust exposure for municipalities and probable conflicts with
the narrower federalist mandate of National League of Cities v. Usery.
The possibly extensive antitrust exposure of local government units is en-
gendered in large part by the failure of the Court to adequately consider
the great variety of municipal government activities as well as the differ-
ing types of authorization granted by states to their political
subdivisions. 8 '
The lack of the constitutionally mandated sovereign status enjoyed by
the states deprives municipalities of the right to regulate their economies,
unless policy or constitutional arguments can be maintained on their be-
half by reason of their relationship with the states. 86 Cities typically rely
upon enabling acts of state legislatures for their powers, since they have
no independent constitutional existence and are the legal creation of
states.187 States delegate broad authority to municipalities under the
181. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 937, 942
(1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109-11 (1978); City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978).
182. 435 U.S. at 415.
183. As noted, the type of municipal activity can vary infinitely as can the method of state au-
thorization. See note 178 supra.
184. See note 169 supra and accompanying text.
185. See Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to Municipal Activities, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
518, 528 (1979).
186. The Constitution safeguards the rights of the states, but is silent about their political subdi-
visions. U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to states those powers not given to the federal government);
id. at amend. XI (immunizing states from suits by citizens of foreign states). See generally Herget,
The Missing Power of Local Governments: A Dii'eirence Between Text and Practice in Our Early
State Constitutions,-62 VA. L. REv. 999 (1976).
187. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923); Hunter v. City of Pittsburg,
207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907). See generally I E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §2.08(a)
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rubric of police power, enabling cities to act for the health, safety, and
welfare of their citizens. In its governmental functions, the municipality is
said to act as the agent of the state."'a Accordingly, municipalities may be
adjudged an arm of the state and given equal constitutional deference
with the states for some purposes, if the municipal activity is derived di-
rectly from the state. 189 Then federal interference with local government
action may impinge upon the sovereign right of the states to govern, as-
suming that the challenged activity is judicially interpreted to be neces-
sary to the autonomy of the state.190 Presumably, regulatory authority
delegated directly to municipalities by the state would qualify for the
state action antitrust exemption if part of a purposeful state decision to
displace competition coupled with active state supervision, since the Su-
preme Court has determined that the states may regulate their economies
free from federal interference.1 91
However, the courts have long recognized that municipalities may act
in a proprietary or commercial capacity as well as in a governmental ca-
pacity. 19 2 Proprietary functions include quasi-public activities performed
for the convenience of the citizenry or for the monetary benefit of the
municipality, such as the ownership and operation of water and power
companies, sewage disposal plants, and transportation systems. 93 Fre-
(3d ed. 1971).
188. i E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §2.09 (3d ed. 1971). See also City of Trenton
v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 191 (1923); City of Longview v. First Nat'l Bank, 152 F.2d 97, 98 (5th
Cir. 1945), cert. denied. 327 U.S. 784 (1946).
189. See, e.g., Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) (double-jeopardy clause); Avery v. Mid-
land Co., 390 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1968) (actions of local government are the actions of the state for
fourteenth amendment purposes); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923) (impairment
of contract clause).
190. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See notes 212-15 infra
and accompanying text. See also California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
100 S. Ct. 937, 943 (1980).
191. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 110-11 (1978); Exxon v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978).
192. See City of High Point v. Duke Power Co., 120 F.2d 866, 870 (4th Cir. 1941), quoting
Illinois Trust & Say. Bank v. City of Arkansas City, 76 F. 271, 282 (8th Cir. 1896).
193. See Note, The Antitrust Liability of Municipalities Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L.
REv. 368, 378 & n.65 (1977). The courts often experience difficulties in ascertaining when to draw
the line between the governmental and proprietary behavior of municipalities. See, e.g., City of
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 191-92 (1923) (no established rule for distinction). See also
Note, Antitrust Law and Municipal Corporations: Are Municipalities Exempt From Sherman Act
Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo. L. J. 1547, 1557 & n.63 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Municipal Corporations]. When municipal bodies perform proprietary or business like functions,
courts treat them as individuals with regard to tort liability. See Vanlandingham, Local Government
Immunity Re-Examined, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 237, 247 (1966). The difficulty, however, in making the
distinction together with often contradictory results has led at least one court to abandon municipal
tort immunity altogether. See Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 261 A.2d 896 (1970). Similarly, in
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quently, municipal operation of a proprietary service results in a munici-
pally controlled monopoly.
A somewhat different relationship between states and municipalities ex-
ists in home rule jurisdictions. Home rule provisions in state constitutions
permit municipalities to administer local affairs without the necessity of
specific state legislative delegation by authorizing broad grants of author-
ity by the legislature or by making such grants directly to the political
subdivisions.1 94 Of course, municipalities have less freedom to act if a
state grants home rule through legislation rather than directly through
the constitution, because a state legislature may always retract or ignore
home rule or the courts may rule that the home rule provisions constitute
an unconstitutional delegation of state power." ' However, in neither situ-
ation are municipalities completely free from state control. If a municipal
ordinance conflicts with state law or if state legislation has preempted a
field, the state will generally prevail, indicating a judicial recognition of at
least some state control. 1 6 Nevertheless, an argument can be made that,
as a general proposition, municipalities in home rule jurisdictions should
not be accorded constitutional recognition as the agents of a state since
home rule municipalities have a substantial, legally definable auton-
omy. 197 Thus, a failure to give constitutional protection to home rule polit-
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 580-83 (1946), the distinction between proprietary and
governmental activities was severely criticized, although not done away with, by the Court in deter-
mining whether a state was liable for federal excise taxes on mineral water produced at state owned
and operated springs. Cities are generally immune from federal income tax liability for income de-
rived through municipal governmental activities, as opposed to activities labeled as proprietary.
United States v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322, 329 (1873); Kreipke v. Commissioner,
32 F.2d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 1929).
194. See Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV.
269 (1968). As of 1966 33 states had enacted some type of constitutional provision for home rule. Id.
at 277. See also Macchiarola, Local Government Home Rule and the Judiciary, 48 J. URE. L. 335
(1971). The trend seems to be for more home rule jurisdictions. Illinois amended its constitution in
1970 to include a home rule provision. ILL. CONST. art. VII, §6(a). See Michael & Norton, Home
Rule in Illinois: A Functional Analysis, 1978 U. ILL. L. FORUM 559. Vanlandingham noted, however,
that home rule is widely practiced in only a few states. Vanlandingham, supra, at 283.
195. Vanlandingham, supra note 194, at 275-76.
196. See Municipal Corporations, supra note 193, at 1560. But see Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,
207 U.S. 161, 179-81 (1907), where the Court suggested that state authority over a municipality's
proprietary activities may be somewhat circumscribed. See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,
342, 344 (1960). The federal government may delegate specific powers to political subdivisions, thus
circumventing state control. See City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320, 340 (1958); City of
Davenport v. Three-fifths of an Acre of Land, 252 F.2d 354, 355-56, 355 n.l (7th Cir. 1958). See
also Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980) (municipalities sued under Civil Rights
Act not entitled to a qualified immunity based on good faith of their officials); Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipalities can be sued directly under Civil Rights Act of
1871).
197. This assumes, of course, that there is no conflict with the state and that the state has not
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ical subdivisions in their areas of independence of action does not inter-
fere with the sovereignty of the states, since there is little or no state
control present. "8
It should be obvious that a municipality may engage in monopoly (or in
a restraint of trade) pursuant to a home rule charter, a broad legislative
enabling act, or a specific delegation of regulatory authority. To escape
antitrust liability, under the City of Lafayette plurality approach, the mu-
nicipal monopoly would have to be authorized by the state pursuant to a
state policy to displace competition. Further, the specific municipal con-
duct attacked would have to be within the contemplation of the state
when it authorized the municipal action. 199
Part of the difficulty with the plurality's approach stems from the ambi-
guity of its use of the term "authorize." Authorized conduct may mean
any activity which does not violate state law. On the other hand, it may
signify that "conscious" authorization is required by the state to exempt
municipal conduct from the antitrust laws. The latter interpretation seems
more plausible, particularly in view of the basic state action immunity
requirement that the activity scrutinized must be part of a state policy,
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed," to displace competi-
tion.200 The additional requirement that the municipal action be within
the contemplation of the state legislature further supports a restricted
reading of the authorization edict. The contemplation requisite necessarily
focuses attention on legislative intent.20 1 Thus, there must be a discernible
legislative intent to displace competition, as opposed to an intent to ex-
empt the municipal conduct,02 for immunity to attach.
At first blush, the ability of a political subdivision to show a legislative
intent to permit monopolistic conduct in lieu of competition where the
preempted the field.
198. The supposed autonomy of home rule municipalities may actually increase the likelihood
that those jurisdictions will have to comply with the antitrust laws. See Bangasser, Exposure of Mu-
nicipal Corporations to Liability for Violations of the Antitrust Laws: Antitrust Immunity After the
City of Lafayette Decision, II URB. LAW. Vii, xxxii (1979). If home rule municipalities do act, for
some purposes, independently of the states, then application of the antitrust laws to those activities
arguably does not infringe upon the sovereign right of the states to displace competition. The munici-
pal activity would be neither part of a recognized state regulatory scheme nor adequately supervised
by the state.
199. 435 U.S. at 415.
200. Id. at 410; New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978); Califor-
nia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 931, 943 (1980).
201. See Note, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 570, 572-73, 594-95.
202. See Star Lines, Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 451 F. Supp. 157, 162, 166-
68 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), where the court found that a state law providing that "the Antitrust laws shall
not be applicable to any action of the Authority taken pursuant to the provisions hereof," id. at 162,
did not, by itself, establish a legislative intent to displace competition with regulation.
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municipality is acting pursuant to broad enabling legislation or a home
rule charter may appear uncertain at best. But it must be remembered
that antitrust immunity depends not only upon state authorization but
also upon the precise nature of the municipal conduct as it relates to the
state authorization. Thus, a municipally controlled public utility may sup-
port a finding of implied legislative intent, or contemplation, even in a
home rule jurisdiction, if municipal utilities are widely permitted in the
state or if the state itself is an active regulator of utilities. 3
However, specific anticompetitive practices perpetrated by a political
subdivision in furtherance of a state granted monopoly would require fur-
ther scrutiny. For example, the allegations in City of Lafayette that the
city sought to defeat electric utility competition and expand its monopoly
by engaging in sham litigation and unlawful tie-ins with city water and
gas service 04 would, if proved, presumably be beyond the contemplation
of the state's authorization of municipal utilities.
A more difficult problem is raised when the municipal activity ques-
tioned is pursuant to the state's authorization or is necessary for the im-
plementation of the authorized conduct. Often, in this context, the munic-
ipality deals directly with private parties, usually to the exclusion of other
private parties, in granting contractual privileges.2 °0 For example, in
Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc.,20 a municipal airport's exclusive li-
censing of the right to pick up passengers at the airport to one taxicab
company was successfully challenged by rival firms. The district court
held it unlikely that the Texas legislature contemplated the implementa-
tion of anticompetitive activities by local government units in their au-
thorized operation of airports. Restraining competition among taxicabs
could not be viewed as necessary or pursuant to the lawful running of a
city airport.207
203. See, e.g., E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301
(E.D. Mich. 1979).
204. 435 U.S. at 392 n.6. See also Note, supra note 185, at 532 & n.113.
205. See, e.g., City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded, 435 U.S. 992 (1978); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975); Saenz v.
University Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973).
206. 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
207. Id. at 1032-33. Interestingly, Surtran involved a home rule charter. The court refused to
grant automatic immunity to home rule cities, ruling that the home rule provisions must first "evince
a state policy 'to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service'" before antitrust
immunity can attach. Id. at 1029, quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 419, 425 (1978). For a pre-City of Lafayette case granting immunity on essentially the
same facts see Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974). See
also Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, 361 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
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Frequently, municipal government agreements with private parties are
necessary to effectuate an authorized municipal project. For example, the
construction of a state authorized municipal hospital necessarily entails
that the municipality let a contract with a general contractor. The state
delegation of authority would presumably not countenance municipal par-
ticipation in a bid-rigging or other restraint of trade, however, absent spe-
cific empowerment. 0 8 Thus, a municipality could not claim antitrust im-
munity for any alleged irregularities in the bidding process but would
have to confront directly antitrust claims brought by disgruntled
contractors.
It should be apparent that the plurality approach, which focuses on the
municipal conduct as well as the nature of the state delegation of author-
ity, produces sensible results in many situations. Where the supposed state
authorization lies in home rule provisions or broad enabling statutes, how-
ever, the difficulty of discerning legislative intent for a particular munici-
pal activity becomes paramount.2"0 As noted, resort to implied legislative
intent, through the use of extrinsic evidence, will often be necessary to
determine whether the municipal conduct falls within the state's
contemplation.210
It is unsettling that such an uncertain standard would determine local
government antitrust liability where the state delegation is broad. For a
municipality to assure itself of immunity, it would be important to show
state control or supervision over its conduct or, at least, that the state
itself engaged in similar anticompetitive conduct or permitted other politi-
208. See City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ind. 1979)
where an electric power company alleged that a municipality had improperly annexed territories adja-
cent to its boundaries, thereby expanding the area served by the municipality's competing electric
utility at the company's expense. The municipality successfully asserted the state action defense be-
cause the relevant Indiana statutes authorized municipalities to monopolize electric, water, sewer, and
other utilities as well as to annex territories and provide mandatory services to the annexed areas.
209. Ultimately, the antitrust liability of home rule municipalities will hinge upon the amount of
control a state is found to exercise over its local government units. Here, the differing approaches of
the plurality and the Chief Justice are critical. Following the Chief Justice's view, it is rare that the
state could be said to compel the anticompetitive conduct of home rule municipalities. 435 U.S. at
425 n.6. Thus, Burger would presumably regard home rule units as the equivalent of private corpora-
tions for antitrust purposes. In contrast, the plurality would not require state compulsion or even
specific delegation of authority to municipalities to engage in anticompetitive activity. Id. at 414-15.
The four member dissent would exempt any government, as opposed to private, action. Id. at 426
(Stewart, J., dissenting). The broad delegation of authority by the state to home rule provinces would
not provide state sanction for local regulatory or entrepreneural action. Hopefully, neither will it serve
to subject every activity by home rule municipalities to possible antitrust liability under the rationale
that home rule units are autonomous. The plurality approach, while vague and difficult to administer
predicalably, at least assures a somewhat middle ground between these extremes.
210. See note 203 supra and accompanying text.
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cal subdivisions to do so."'
Further, the plurality's focus on legislative intent to displace competi-
tion necessarily supplants the ability of a municipality to act in contraven-
tion of the antitrust laws to further a legitimate governmental objective or
perhaps to make fundamental decisions about public health, safety, or
protection.""' The plurality, pointing to the lack of independent sovereign
status of municipalities, was simply unwilling to permit the cities to ad-
vance their own interests at the expense of competition. 1 Thus, the state
mandate must be ever present for municipal immunity no matter how
compelling the local decision to disregard the antitrust laws may
appear.""'
In this context the plurality standard conflicts with the Court's recogni-
tion in National League of Cities v. Usery of state and local freedom
from federal interference when performing integral governmental func-
tions. As noted previously, the state sovereignty principles of National
League of Cities should be significantly more restricted than the .state
action antitrust doctrine . 1  The plurality's emphasis on legislative intent,
however, may create instances in which National League of Cities would
require federal noninterference even though the conduct would not qualify
for Parker immunity. An integral government function carried on without
discernible legislative contemplation would seemingly necessitate resort to
National League of Cities to forestall antitrust intervention.
The decision in Jordan v. Mills36 is illustrative. A prison inmate at a
211. See Avery v. Midland Co., 390 U.S. 474, 481 (1968). The plurality in City of Lafayette
noted that state policy may be contrary to an anticompetitive policy adopted by a municipality even
though the local policy might not violate state law. It was pointed out that if that occurred, state
policy could hardly be said to foster, much less compel, the anticompetitive practices. 435 U.S. at 414
n.44. Certainly that would generally be the case with regard to anticompetitive decisions by home
rule subdivisions. Adoption of the Chief Justice's approach would preordain antitrust exposure for
those local government units.
The plurality refers to the significance in the grant of antitrust immunity in Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 360 (1977), to the fact that the state policy there "was one clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed . . . and actively supervised" by the state. 435 U.S. at 410. Some commentators have
believed that the clear statement and/or the active supervision requirements are or should be implicit
in the plurality's approach. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 54, at 282-84; Note,
supra note 185, at 523-24.
212. See, e.g., City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Assoc., 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded, 435 U.S. 992 (1978). But see Huron Valley Hosp. Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp.
1301 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
213. 435 U.S. at 413-17.
214. The Chief Justice's test for immunity is even more exacting. He would require that the local
activity be compelled by state and, further, that the conduct be essential to the state's plan to displace
competition. 435 U.S. at 425 n.6.
215. See notes 170-72 supra and accompanying text.
216. 473 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
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Michigan state prison sought to maintain a class action against prison
officials for alleged price fixing and monopolistic activity in the operation
of the prison's inmate store. The court was unwilling to find that City of
Lafayette was inapposite simply because state officials rather than officials
of political subdivisions had been sued. 17 Further, if the City of Lafayette
plurality rationale was applied, the court stated that it would be difficult
to find that the Michigan legislature "contemplated the anticompetitive
activity of its officials in running the inmate store" when it granted the
Department of Corrections broad powers to manage the state prisons.21 8
However, the court ultimately concluded that the state action doctrine did
attach based upon language in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar and Bates
v. State Bar which could be read as permitting immunity for "primary
governmental functions" such as the regulation of prisons and
prisoners.21
The court, assuming arguendo that its conclusion about the state action
doctrine was wrong, proceeded to find the defendants immune from anti-
trust attack pursuant to the federalist principles of National League of
Cities.120 The court explicitly recognized that the plurality's legislative in-
tent mandate rendered it possible for the state action immunity not to
apply to conduct which would be protected under National League of Cit-
ies if the application of the antitrust laws would interfere "with the
State's freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions. 22 1 Thus, even if the plurality's contemplation
test failed to immunize the anticompetitive operation of prison stores, Na-
tional League of Cities would protect the conduct as essential to the
traditional governmental function of administering prisons.2 The court
believed it imperative that the state have some discretion with respect to
providing a prison store as part of the delivery of integral governmental
services. 22
The Jordan court's characterization of the operation of a prison store
as an integral governmental service because it is part of the state's tradi-
217. Id. at 15. The court believed that although the City of Lafayette plurality took pains to
distinguish actions against state officials and actions against local government units, the plurality
opinion was ambiguous about the application of different Parker v. Brown standards to separate gov-
ernmental levels.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 15-16, citing Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 361-62 (1977).
220.. 473 F. Supp. at 17-19.
221. Id. at 19.
222. See 426 U.S. at 847-48.
223. 473 F. Supp. at 19. The Jordan court stated that to find National League of Cities inappli-
cable because operating a prison store is not essential to running the prison would render it a nullity.
Id. at 18.
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tional administration of prisons may be overbroad. It illustrates, how-
ever, the peculiar possibility of a constitutionally ordained recognition of
states rights being applied more broadly, at least in some instances, than
a judicially created immunity grounded in policy.
The same difficulty may arise with respect to anticompetitive municipal
activities that may be deemed part of an integral governmental function.
For example, broad enabling act authority or home rule authority may
not meet the contemplation!standard if a municipality decides, for public
health purposes, to replace a private ambulance service with a munici-
pally funded one. Similarly, if a city opens a municipal waste disposal site
for public sanitation purposes and requires all solid waste to be deposited
there, to the detriment of privately owned waste processors, legislative
contemplation may be lacking although characterization of the service as
an integral part of a traditional governmental function would be
permissible."
National League of Cities grants immunity to local government units
only because they "derive their authority and power from their respective
States." 2 0 Jordan illustrates, however, that it is unlikely that the courts,
when deciding whether a governmental activity is integral, will pay as
much heed to legislative intent as the City of Lafayette plurality requires
for state action purposes. Although integral municipal services can pre-
sumably point to some type of state authorization, it may often be ques-
tionable whether the specific act complained of can be said to have been
within the contemplation of the legislature when the authority was
granted.
The possibility of further conflict between the Parker doctrine and Na-
tional League of Cities is raised by the Supreme Court's recent decision
in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
224. Presumably state and local immunity from federal interference is more extensive when di-
rected against a federal statute not specifically meant to usurp state laws than when Congress in-
tended federal exclusivity. See notes 128-32 supra and accompanying text.
225. Another approach is illustrated by the decision in Cedar-Riverside Assocs., Inc. v. United
States, 459 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Minn. 1978). In that case private developers sued, among others, a city
and its housing authority alleging that they had conspired to prevent plaintiffs from participating in
an urban renewal project in violation of the Sherman Act. The district court, in considering whether
the defendants were immune from the antitrust claims, set forth a dual alternative test which incorpo-
rates both the standards of the City of Lafayette plurality and National League of Cities (although
National League of Cities was not cited). According to the court, the conduct is immune if the state
action involved is of "such 'signal importance in our national traditions and governmental structure'
as to overcome the fundamental policies of the federal antitrust laws" or if the local government unit
has acted under an "adequate state mandate" where "the legislature contemplated the kind of action
complained of." Id. at 1297-98.
226. 426 U.S. at 856 n.20.
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Inc.22 The Court, citing the City of Lafayette plurality opinion, held that
for Parker to apply to state conduct there must be a "clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed" state policy coupled with active state super-
vision. " ' The active supervision requirement, if applicable to municipali-
ties, would limit the reach of the Parker doctrine to indisputably integral
local government functions which were not subject to effective state re-
view. Conceivably, municipal health care or public safety functions would
face possible antitrust scrutiny. Thus, the state action antitrust doctine
would, in many instances, not apply to local activities able to withstand
federal interference pursuant to National League of Cities.
It is questionable whether a showing of active state supervision is neces-
sary for political subdivisions to gain Parker immunity, however, in spite
of the seemingly unequivocal language of California Retail Liquor. First
it should be noted that California Retail Liquor involved an action to
enjoin a state agency from enforcing a state statute.2 ' No municipal con-
duct was implicated. Secondly the Court's reference to City of Lafayette
is somewhat enigmatic since it is highly questionable that the City of La-
fayette plurality required active state supervision in addition to legislative
authorization and contemplation of the municipal anticompetitive con-
duct.230 The plurality's one reference to active supervision came in its dis-
cussion of the Bates case and was used to reject the claim that municipal-
ities automatically qualify for state action antitrust immunity.231 It was
not referred to when the plurality articulated the standards necessary for
local government immunity.2 8'
Although the absence of an active supervision requirement for munici-
pal antitrust immunity would eliminate a good deal of the potential con-
flict between National League of Cities and the Parker doctrine on the
local government level, discord between the two is still apparent on the
227. 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980).
228. Id. at 943, citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
229. Midcal Aluminum originally sought a writ of mandate enjoining the California Department
of Alcoholic Beverage Control from enforcing the state's wine pricing system. Midcal had been
charged by the department with selling wine below an effective price schedule and selling wine for
which no fair trade contract or pricing schedule had been filed. 100 S. Ct. at 940.
230. See Note, supra note 185, at 523-24 & n.52.
231. 435 U.S. at 410-11.
232. Id. at 414-15. Further, the Court's holding in California Retail Liquor rested squarely on
the Parker v. Brown principle that a state cannot grant antitrust immunity to violators by authorizing
the violation or by declaring their action lawful. 100 S. Ct. at 944, citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 351 (1943). Thus, the lack of state control over the price fixing and fair trade allowances man-
dated a finding of no immunity absent any reference to City of Lafayette. See Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
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state level. California Retail Liquor makes it clear that active supervision
is necessary for immunity for state officials or agencies. Jordan v. Mills23 8
is again illustrative. There the court found that the operation of a prison
store was protected by National League of Cities from federal interfer-
ence because the running of the store was encompassed in the "integral"
governmental function of administering prisons. 4 Following the analysis
of the Supreme Court in California Retail Liquor, however, the Parker
doctrine could easily be found inapplicable to the operation of the prison
stores since it is questionable whether the state actively supervised the
alleged price fixing activities of the store.5
If active supervision is required for Parker immunity to attach to state
activities but not to municipal conduct, municipalities may have, in some
instances, a broader grant of antitrust immunity than state activites. It is
questionable whether the plurality intended or foresaw such a result. The
plurality's contemplation test assures state control over any local conduct
immune from antitrust, however. Legislative contemplation focuses the
state authority necessary to immunize municipal conduct and may, to a
great extent, equate with the active supervision standard required by state
regulatory immunity.
The distinction would thus seem to be workable in practice. Further
conflict with the federalist principles of National League of Cities would
be avoided. National League of Cities necessarily reflects a rationale dis-
posed to identifying and protecting important government functions
rather than concentrating on state legislative action. Thus National
League of Cities should present a standard for state sovereignty which
remains untouched by the antitrust laws, which were not specifically
designed to constrain state conduct. 6
VI. CONCLUSION
The antitrust state action decisions together with the Supreme Court
opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery provide the needed frame-
work for analysis of rights of states to make governmental decisions free
from federal intrusion. The amount of deference due the states depends
upon the nature of the state activity involved as well as the general or
express applicability of the federal law. Further, it is clear that the ability
of political subdivisions to resist federal intrusion depends on the relation-
ship of municipal conduct in question to the governing state. Although the
233. 473 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1979). See notes 216-25 supra and accompanying text.
234. 473 F. Supp. at 18-19.
235. But see note 219 and accompanying text.
236. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
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nature of the relationship required for immunity is uncertain, the Court
has made it clear that the ability of states to delegate authority to politi-
cal subdivisions falls under the sovereignty rubric.
If the concept of dual sovereignty is to have any significance, the states
must be given room to make governmental and economic decisions in-
dependently of the federal government. Thankfully, National League of
Cities recognizes the basic necessity of this notion. There are constitu-
tional and policy reasons for not extending the autonomy to municipali-
ties, however. Moreover, subjecting municipal conduct to federal scrutiny
does not interfere with state sovereignty since the states can usurp federal
regulation by acting to exercise governmental authority over the local
government.

